Abstract-A well-known inner bound of the stability region of the finite-user slotted Aloha protocol (with fixed contention probabilities) on the collision channel with n users assumes worst case service rates (all user queues non-empty). Using this inner bound as a feasible set of achievable rates, a characterization of the throughput-fairness tradeoff over this set is obtained, where the throughput is defined as the sum of the individual user rates, and two definitions of fairness are considered: the JainChiu-Hawe function and the sum-user α-fair (isoelastic) utility function. This characterization is obtained using both an equality constraint and an inequality constraint on the throughput, and properties of the optimal controls, the optimal rates, and the maximum fairness as a function of the target throughput are established. A key structural property underpinning all theorems is the observation that the vector of contention probabilities that extremizes both fairness objectives has its nonzero components taking at most two distinct values.
I. INTRODUCTION
W E investigate the throughput-fairness tradeoff for the finite-user slotted Aloha 1 medium access control (MAC) protocol [1] , [2] serving n users contending on a shared collision channel. Throughput-fairness tradeoffs naturally arise in settings of shared access to a constrained resource, where maximum use of the resource is at odds with fair access to the resource, on account of the inefficiency incurred in resource contention. In the setting of Aloha, this incurred inefficiency takes the form of wasted slots in which either no user contends (idle) or multiple users contend (collision). Trivially, maximum throughput of one successful packet per time slot is achieved by the unfair allocation granting one user access and shutting out all other users, while the maximally fair allocation granting each user equal access achieves a throughput that decays to zero in the number of users. Our focus is on characterizing the tradeoff connecting these two extreme points.
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TIT.2017.2705029 1 We consider the case of "static" Aloha, with contention probabilities for each user fixed in time, as opposed to "dynamic" Aloha, with contention probabilities varying in time, say, via a backoff mechanism.
Although modern MAC protocols in use today are far more complex and more sophisticated than Aloha, many of them nonetheless retain at their core the notion of random access, which is the defining characteristic of Aloha. It is therefore natural, in our opinion, to first analyze the throughput-fairness tradeoff in random access in the canonical setting of slotted Aloha before seeking to characterize such tradeoffs under more complicated protocols.
One difficulty precluding this goal from being achieved is that the stability region for slotted Aloha on the collision channel remains largely unknown, in spite of 35+ years of effort. Because of this, we employ a well-known inner bound on the stability region, obtained by assuming each of the user's queues is nonempty, thereby yielding a worst-case effective service rate seen by each user. This inner bound is known to be tight for all special cases for which the stability region of slotted Aloha is known. Even with this simplifying assumption, however, the throughput-fairness problem is still nontrivial on account of the fact that the inner bound cannot be described explicitly. Rather, the inner bound is given as the image of the function mapping vectors of contention probabilities (controls) to (worst-case) packet transmission rates, over the set of all possible controls.
A. Related Work
The throughput-fairness tradeoff literature is quite large and diverse, stemming from its relevance to a wide variety of disciplines, including queueing theory, communication networks, optimization, and economics. As such, we restrict our discussion to only the most pertinent prior work. Specifically, we summarize prior work on each of the two fairness metrics used in this paper, namely, the Jain-Chiu-Hawe function and the α-fair utility function.
The Jain-Chiu-Hawe fairness measure [3] , hereafter simply Jain's fairness, measures the fairness of an n-vector x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), representing in our context the vector of user rates, as certain normalized "distance" from x to the "all-rates-equal" ray passing from the origin through the point 1. This metric has been widely adopted, e.g., [4] , [5] .
The α-fair parameterized family of utility functions was introduced to the networking community in [6] , but is nearly identical to the classic isoelastic utility function in economics [7] . The α-fair family of utility functions has found profitable use in characterizing throughput-fairness tradeoffs and resource allocation policies in wired and wireless networks, and in that sense may be viewed as part of the larger body of work termed network utility maximization (NUM), e.g., [8] - [11] . The basic concept in NUM is to associate with 0018-9448 © 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
each user a utility (often assumed to be concave increasing) that depends upon the resources allocated to the user, and seek a feasible resource allocation that maximizes the sumuser utility. In essence, the concavity of the utility function captures the law of diminishing returns for each user, and thus optimizing sum utility over all feasible allocations yields a solution that is "fair" in the sense that all users enjoy a common marginal utility. Returning to α-fair utility functions, the parameter α ≥ 0 controls the "concavity" of the utility function, where α = 0 corresponds to a linear utility function (no diminishing returns), α = 1 is a logarithmic utility function (so-called proportional fair utility), and as α → ∞ the utilityoptimal resource allocation is the so-called max-min fair allocation. Given this, it is natural to think that increasing α would trade sum-user throughput for fairness, although recent work [12] - [15] has identified counter-examples. Recent work has addressed throughput-fairness tradeoffs using both these fairness measures in the context of downlink scheduling [5] , [15] . In contrast, our focus is on uplink, and this fundamental difference limits the applicability of many of the results in [5] and [15] to our setting. An axiomatic approach to fairness is given in [16] , with an insightful discussion unifying (and extending) Jain's fairness and α-fairness.
B. Outline and Contributions
The primary contribution of this paper is a characterization of the throughput-fairness (T-F) tradeoff for n users employing slotted Aloha on a collision channel. This is done through six theorems:
• Theorem 1 (2) gives the T-F tradeoff under Jain's fairness with a throughput equality (inequality) constraint and Theorem 3 gives properties of the optimal controls, optimal rates, and the T-F tradeoff itself.
• Theorem 4 (5) gives the T-F tradeoff under α-fairness, for α ≥ 1, with a throughput equality (inequality) constraint, and Theorem 6 gives properties of the optimal controls, optimal rates, and the T-F tradeoff itself. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model and problem statement are introduced in §II, while §III contains results common to both fairness measures. Building upon §III, the next two sections ( §IV, §V) address the Aloha throughputfairness tradeoff under Jain's and α-fairness respectively. Finally a conclusion is offered in §VI. Three appendices precede the references, holding long proofs from §III, §IV, and §V respectively. Table I lists all the results in the paper, and Table II provides general notation.
II. MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
This section is divided into the following subsections: an introduction of some general notation in §II-A, a discussion of the Aloha protocol and the collision channel in §II-B, definition of the Aloha stability region A and its inner bound in §II-C, and the definitions of throughput and fairness in §II-D. 
A. General Notation
All vectors are lowercase and bold and are by default of length n. Inequalities between two vectors are understood to hold component-wise. We write [n] to denote {1, . . . , n} for n ∈ N. The unit vector with a one in position i is denoted e i , for i ∈ [n] . The all-one vector is denoted by 1, the uniform distribution 1 n 1 is denoted u, and the all-zero vector is denoted by 0. Euclidean distance is denoted d(x, y). Cardinality of a set V is denoted |V|. We sometimes writez to denote 1 − z. Table II lists frequently used notation; additional notation will be explained at first use.
B. The Aloha Protocol and the Collision Channel
Recall a MAC protocol specifies a mechanism to coordinate competing users' access to the shared channel; we consider the finite-user slotted Aloha MAC protocol operating on a collision channel. The (fixed) protocol parameters are (n, x, p), where i ) n ∈ N is the number of users, ii) x ∈ R n + is an n-vector denoting the independent arrival rates of users' data packets, which we henceforth call the rate vector, and iii) p ∈ [0, 1] n is an n-vector indicating the user contention (or channel access) probabilities, which we henceforth call the control vector. Each user has an associated packet queue that can hold an infinite number of packets, stored in order of arrival. Each packet will be removed from the queue if and only if it has just been successfully transmitted. The channels are error-free. Time is slotted and synchronized. At the beginning of each time slot, every user with a nonempty queue, say user i ∈ [n], contends for channel access to the common base station by transmitting its head-of-line packet with a fixed probability p i , independent of anything else. The collision channel assumption means the state of the channel in each time slot may be classified as i ) idle (no one attempts to transmit, either because of having an empty queue or electing not to transmit), ii) collision (more than one user transmits, and all attempted transmissions fail), or iii) success (precisely one user transmits, and this attempted transmission succeeds). This ternary feedback is error-free and instantaneous at the end of each time slot.
C. The Stability Region A and Its Inner Bound
An important yet still open problem is the queueingtheoretic stability region [17] (also called the network layer capacity region [18, p. 28] ) of this model, denoted A ( A for Aloha), which contains all arrival rate vectors x that can be stabilized by the protocol, i.e., for each x ∈ A there exists a control vector p that stabilizes each of the n queues, meaning as time tends to infinity, no user will accumulate an infinite number of packets waiting to be transmitted. Unfortunately, to date, the Aloha stability region is open, even for the case of independent arrival processes, for n > 2 users. A summary of the history of this problem is provided in [19] , with compelling recent work including [20] - [23] among others.
As A is unknown, we employ a suitable inner bound on A as a proxy for the stability region of slotted Aloha. This inner bound, denoted below, has been proved to coincide with the exact stability region for all special cases for which the stability region is known ( [17] , [24] ), and has been conjectured ([25, Sec. V], [19, Sec. V, Th. 2]) to in fact be the stability region, A . The set is defined as
The expression p i j =i (1 − p j ) is the worst-case service rate for user i 's queue, namely the service rate assuming all other users have non-empty queues and thus all users are eligible for channel contention. In particular, user i 's transmission is successful in such a time slot if user i elects to contend (with probability p i ) and each other user j = i does not contend (each with independent probability 1 − p j ). Clearly, is an inner bound, since an arrival rate that is stabilizable under the worst-case service rate is certainly stabilizable under a better service rate. It may be shown [26, Sec. II, Proposition 2] that an equivalent definition of is to change all the inequalities to equality, i.e., x ∈ if and only if there exists a p ∈ [0, 1] n for which x = x(p), where
We refer to such a p as a (critical compatible) control for x. 2 Based on the above definition of , testing whether or not a candidate x is or is not in is equivalent to the solvability of x = x(p) over p ∈ [0, 1] n . The definition of is therefore implicit, in the sense that testing membership x ∈ requires establishing the existence (or not) of a suitable control p. When addressing throughput-fairness tradeoffs we will be optimizing an objective function over , which thus becomes the feasible set for the optimization. The implicit characterization of is what makes the corresponding throughput-fairness tradeoff optimization problem non-trivial. The natural approach, which we employ, is to make p ∈ [0, 1] n the optimization variable, thereby requiring the corresponding nonlinear compositions on both the throughput and fairness functions, i.e., T (x(p)) and F(x(p)), defined below. To emphasize this distinction, we refer to x as a rate vector in rate space, and p as a control vector in control space.
The boundary of in R n + is denoted ∂ and is characterized [27] as
where S ≡ {z ∈ R n + :
n i=1 z i ≤ 1} denotes the "standard" unit simplex, and its "face", denoted
is the set of probability vectors on [n]. Thus, Pareto efficient throughputs, i.e., x ∈ ∂ , are achieved by and only by [28] controls that are probability vectors, i.e., p ∈ ∂S. For this reason, we call ∂S the set of efficient controls. It may be helpful to visualize and its boundary ∂ using Fig. 2 ( §IV-A) for the n = 2 case, where they are shown as the light blue shaded area and the brown curve respectively.
D. Throughput and Two Fairness Measures
The sum-user throughput of any rate vector x ∈ is defined as
Note T (x) ∈ [0, 1] since, by the definition of the collision channel, there is at most one successful transmission on the channel in each time slot. We define the vector θ = (θ 1 , . . . , θ n ) with θ 1 = 1 and
as the vector of critical throughputs.
Define the rate vector m ≡ θ n n 1 = x(u) associated with θ n , i.e., m is the rate vector for the uniform control u, with corresponding throughput T (m) = θ n . Geometrically, m is the unique intersection of the ray from the origin through 1 (the "all-rates-equal" ray) with ∂ . In addition, the following lemma (the proof of which is straightforward and is omitted), used in some proofs, is relevant to in that it implies: a) geometrically, the "all-rates-equal" ray resides inside until it hits the boundary ∂ at x = θ n n 1, shown in Fig. 2 as the black dot, and b) there only exist(s) two (one) control(s) p for any rate vector x on this ray segment that lies inside (on the boundary of) , in the sense of (2).
Lemma 1: Let an integer n ≥ 2 be given. The function
and decreasing when p ∈ [1/n, 1], with the maximum
The fairness of x is denoted F(x); we will employ the following two fairness definitions in this paper. The first, Jain-Chiu-Hawe fairness [3] , henceforth referred to simply as Jain's fairness and denoted F J (x), is a now classic means of quantifying the fairness of a resource allocation x:
The Jain's fairness function has the following properties: i ) scale invariance, i.e., F J (βx) = F J (x) for any β ∈ R ++ ; and ii) boundedness, i.e., F J ∈ [1/n, 1], with F J (βe i ) = 1/n for any i ∈ [n] and F J (β1) = 1 for any β ∈ R ++ . The second fairness measure, the α-fair sum-user utility function, defined as
for α ≥ 0, is the sum-user utility of the allocation x, where the (common) per-user utility functions are defined, for α ∈ R, as 3 :
Maximization of sum-user utility over a set of feasible allocations, for any concave increasing utility function U α (x), often implicitly enforces a throughput-fairness tradeoff. For example, the cases α = 0, 1, and ∞ have corresponding optimal 3 Note that lim α→1 U α (x) = ± 1 0 , i.e., is undefined, and not equal to U 1 (x) = log x. One way to rectify this discrepancy is to modify the definition to include a constant shift, e.g.,Ũ α (x) ≡ 1 1−α x 1−α − 1 , which is known as the isoelastic utility function in economics. As is conventional in the networking literature, we omit this constant as it has no effect on the extremizers.
solutions that maximize throughput, proportional fairness (logutility), and max-min fairness, respectively. It is for this reason that we refer to F α (x) as a fairness function.
Remark 1: Observe that under the throughput equality constraint T (x) = θ , the objective F J (x) is inversely proportional to F −1 (x), i.e., F α (x) in (8) with α = −1, and as such maximizing F J (x) under T (x) = θ is equivalent, in the sense of having the same extremizers, to minimizing F −1 (x). Even though F α only possesses the desirable properties of a utility function for α ≥ 0, this equivalence allows us to study extremizers of F J and F α (α ≥ 0) within a unified framework (i.e., by extending the domain of α to R), as in Prop. 4 in §III. 4 The general throughput-fairness tradeoff for slotted Aloha, using the proxy stability region as the feasible set of arrival rate vectors, is the Pareto frontier of the parametric plot (T (x), F(x)) over x ∈ . An equivalent alternate formulation of the throughput-fairness tradeoff is to seek to maximize F(x) over x ∈ such that T (x) = θ , for θ ∈ (0, 1) a target throughput constraint, where omit θ = 0 and θ = 1 as target throughputs as both correspond to trivial edge cases. Furthermore, we will address two types of throughput constraints in this paper: i ) a throughput equality constraint T (x) = θ , and ii) a throughput inequality constraint T (x) ≥ θ . The equality constraint is used, as mentioned above, to characterize the throughput-fairness tradeoff, while the inequality constraint admits a natural operational interpretation: allocate "resources" as fairly as possible subject to the sum throughput exceeding a minimum requirement. As we will show, there are parameter regimes wherein these two problems are the same, and regimes where they are different.
Finally, observe that , F(x), and T (x) are each permutation invariant, and as such any extremizer x * that maximizes fairness under a throughput constraint is permutation invariant, meaning any permutation of x * is likewise an extremizer.
Further Notes About Notation: Auxiliary functions (typically named as f 1 , f 2 , etc.) used in proofs are understood to be internal meaning a different function with the same name might be used in a different proof. The following inequality about the natural logarithm function is frequently used in the paper:
which is strict unless z = 0. Finally, we use F * (θ ) to represent the maximum fairness for a given target throughput θ , which is not to be confused with F(x) defined in (7) and (8).
III. PROPERTIES OF OPTIMAL CONTROLS
We use the framework of majorization in §III-A to establish that it suffices to restrict the control space from [0, 1] n to the set of efficient controls, namely ∂S (4), and then use Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions in §III-B to establish structural properties of those controls that extremize
A. A Majorization Approach
We address the Aloha T-F tradeoff problem through the lens of majorization [29] , the origins of which are rooted in questions of fairness. Majorization defines a partial order on the set of vectors with the same length and sum of components. More precisely, a is majorized by b, denoted
, where a [i] (b [i] ) is the i th component of a (b) sorted in nonincreasing order. For example, the "quasi-uniform" probability vectors (in ∂S) below are majorized as [29, p. 9 
As the above example suggests, in many contexts the statement x ≺ y may be interpreted as x is more fair than y, in the sense that the components of vector x are more nearly equal than those of y. It is therefore natural to try to study our T-F tradeoff within the framework of majorization. The class of Schur (concave or convex) functions are symmetric functions that preserve majorization, i.e., a symmetric F is Remark 2: An immediate consequence of this result is that it allows us to restrict the set of feasible controls from [0, 1] n to [0, 1) n . First, observe that if there are multiple users contending with probability one, then the corresponding rate vector is x = 0, and as such T (x) = 0, meaning such points cannot achieve any target throughput θ ∈ (0, 1). Second, if there is a unique user, say i , with p i = 1 (i.e., p j ∈ [0, 1) for all j = i ), then x = π i e i , where π i = j =i (1 − p j ). But, such an x majorizes every other feasible point (with the same component sum) in rate space, and thus will not maximize either of our fairness objectives.
The following result establishes two key facts. First, it suffices to consider only efficient controls, p ∈ ∂S, for maximizing fairness under a throughput (equality) constraint. Second, there is no majorization relationship between any two efficient controls that both satisfy the throughput constraint. Thus, majorization does not by itself solve the T-F tradeoff optimization problem.
Proposition 2: Fix the number of users n and the target throughput θ ∈ (θ n , 1). Define the hyperplane H θ = {x ∈ R n + : T (x) = θ } of rate vectors with throughput θ . Define θ = ∩ H θ , ∂ θ = ∂ ∩ H θ , and int θ = θ \ ∂ θ as the set of stable, stable efficient, and stable inefficient rate vectors with throughput θ , respectively. Then 1) for any x ∈ int θ , there exists some x ∈ ∂ θ such that x ≺ x;
2) for any distinct x, x both in ∂ θ , it holds that x ≺ x and x ≺ x. The proof is found in Appendix I-A. One consequence is the following.
Corollary 1: When maximizing either Jain's fairness (7) or the α-fair objective (8) over subject to a throughput equality constraint T (x) = θ for θ ∈ [θ n , 1), it suffices to restrict the feasible set to the set of points on the boundary of that satisfy the throughput constraint, i.e., to ∂ θ (defined in Prop. 2). This then implies an optimal control, p * , defined later in §IV-B, is in ∂S.
This corollary follows almost immediately from Prop. 1 and Prop. 2 (item 1)) taking into account the fact that p ∈ ∂S iff x(p) ∈ ∂ [28] . An independent proof is given in Appendix I-A for the case of Jain's fairness, highlighting the geometric intuition behind the result.
B. Optimal Controls Under a Throughput Constraint
In this subsection we present results that apply to both the Jain's fairness analysis in §IV and the α-fair analysis in §V. First, we define some useful restrictions of the feasible set of controls in Def. 1; this restriction is an essential component in most of our subsequent proofs. Second, in Prop. 3 we present some properties associated with the throughput constraint T (x(p)) = θ over this restricted set. Finally, Prop. 4 establishes that the optimal controls for both fairness objectives will lie in the restricted set in Def. 1.
Definition 1: Let p ∈ [0, 1) n be a control, and define the following: These two values are denoted p s , p l (for "small" and "large", respectively) with 0 < p s < p l < 1. Moreover, any such p has a total of n nonzero components, of which k take value p s and n − k take value p l , for some k ∈ [n − 1] and some n ∈ {2, . . . , n}, and p s ∈ (0, 1/n ).
We call ( p s , k, n ) the three free parameters which together characterize a p ∈ ∂S 2 , and write p( p s , k, n ) to denote a p with those parameters. The rates associated with controls p s , p l are denoted x s , x l , respectively, with
and it is easily shown that 
The following proposition gives properties of the solution of the throughput equality constraint T (x(p)) = θ over p ∈ ∂S 2 . Leveraging the ( p s , k, n ) parameterization in Def. 1, we define (for fixed n ∈ {2, . . . , n}):
, and as such at most one
, and is the solution to
which can be expressed as an order-n polynomial (in p s ) equation. 2) Now only fix n . The range of achievable through-
, for some t ∈ {2, . . . , n}, the set of (k, n ) pairs for which there exists p s
k ∈ {n − t + 1, . . . , n − 1}} (18) and is illustrated in Fig. 1 (top). The proof is in Appendix I-B. The following proposition shows that optimal controls for both the Jain's fairness and α-fair objectives will lie in the restricted set of Def. 1. (18) (to scale, the figure shows the case t = 4 and n = 12, with the value n = 8 selected on the n axis). Bottom: Illustration that k ∈ {n −t +1, . . . , n −1} is necessary and sufficient 
i ) For both the inequality and equality constrained problems above, a necessary condition for p to extremize (19) is |V(p)| ≤ 2. ii) For the inequality constrained problem: if an optimizer p * of (19) (top) has the property that |V(p * )| = 2, then at the optimum the throughput constraint holds with equality, i.e., T (x(p * )) = θ . The proof is in Appendix I-B.
IV. JAIN-CHIU-HAWE FAIRNESS TRADEOFF
Recall from §II-D that maximizing F J (x) (7) under a throughput equality constraint T (x) = θ is equivalent, in the sense of having the same extremizers, to minimizing F −1 (x) (8), i.e., α = −1, under the same constraint. As mentioned in §II-C, any x ∈ may be expressed as x(p) (2) Fig. 2 . Illustration of the proof of Prop. 5, the Jain throughput-fairness tradeoff for n = 2 users. Shown are the set , its boundary ∂ , two throughput constraint hyperplanes H θ for θ ∈ {1/3, 3/5}, and the maximum fairness line {(
for some p ∈ [0, 1] n . Thus, an equivalent formulation of the Jain throughput-fairness optimization problem for n users with target throughput θ ∈ (0, 1) is:
This section is comprised of three subsections. We give: i ) preliminary results in §IV-A, ii) the main results in §IV-B, and iii) some additional properties of the Jain throughputfairness tradeoff in §IV-C.
A. Preliminary Results
We start with the special case n = 2. Proposition 5: The throughput-fairness tradeoff under Jain's fairness metric, for n = 2 users, is
Proof: For the n = 2 case we may use a direct approach (instead of solving (20)), since the set may be written explicitly (i.e., parameter-free) as = {x ∈ R 2 + : Fig. 2 . 6 As evident from the figure, the constrained feasible set is the intersection of the throughput constraint line (for general n, a hyperplane)
Define the maximum fairness line {x : x 1 = x 2 } (for general n, the ray emanating from the origin 0 passing through 1), on which F J (x) = 1. In the case of θ ∈ (0, 1/2], we see ∩ H θ intersects this ray, i.e., F J (x) = 1 is feasible. In the case of θ ∈ (1/2, 1), F J (x) = 1 is not feasible, but the fairness is easily shown to be monotone increasing on H θ as x moves towards x 1 = x 2 (c.f., Fig. 8 in the proof of Cor. 1 in §III-A for general n), and as such, the optimal fairness is achieved at the two points where
These two equations together yield the solutions
, from which the maximum fairness may be computed to be the second expression in (21) .
The basic idea in establishing the Jain throughput-fairness tradeoff (Th. 1) is to first apply Cor. 1 in §III-A to restrict the feasible set from p ∈ [0, 1) n to ∂S, then apply Prop. 4 in §III-B to further restrict it to ∂S 1,2 , and finally Th. 1 is proved by employing Prop. 3 in §III-B and Prop. 6 below, the proof of which is found in Appendix II-A.
Leveraging (15) in §III and observe the Jain objective F −1 (x(p)) in (20) may be written as
Prop. 6 establishes two key monotonicity properties of the objective (22) under the throughput equality constraint over the restricted set p ∈ ∂S 2 .
obeys the following two monotonicity properties for all
In Fig. 1 (top) , the two monotonicity results show F −1 is decreasing in k along any vertical line (fixed n ), and along any diagonal line with unit slope (fixed n l = n − k).
B. Main Results
For general (n, θ), where n > 2 and θ ∈ (0, 1), we are not able to obtain an explicit expression for the throughputfairness tradeoff, primarily because there is no known explicit characterization of for n > 2. If x * is an optimal rate vector, i.e., a minimizer of (20), then we refer to any p * satisfying x(p * ) = x * , for p → x i defined in (2), as a corresponding optimal control. The main theorem of this subsection is an implicit characterization of this tradeoff, meaning we characterize p * for each θ (as the solution of a polynomial equation), from which we can compute F −1 (x(p * )). We reiterate the permutation invariance of both x * and p * .
Theorem 1 (Throughput-Fairness Tradeoff Under Jain's Fairness):
The throughput-fairness tradeoff for n ≥ 2 users under Jain's fairness metric, with a throughput equality constraint T (x) = θ , for θ ∈ (0, 1), includes three regimes, illustrated in Fig. 3 , parameterized by θ : 1) if θ < θ n , then the maximum fairness is F * J = 1, achieved when every user receives equal rate:
with the corresponding maximum fairness F * J = t/n. The inverse of the functioñ
is a monotone, differentiable, and convex interpolation between the points {(θ t , (12) with k * = 1, n * = t, and p * s the unique real root on (0, 1/t) of the following (order-t) polynomial (in p s ) equation:
The proof is found in Appendix II-B. The T-F tradeoff plots for n = {1, . . . , 4} users are illustrated in Fig. 4 (bottom) where regime 1) is omitted. Remark 3: It can be verified that in the statement of Th. 1, regime 2) can be merged into 3) by allowing (24) to be solved for p * s on (0, 1/t]. They are stated separately for conceptual clarity and better consistency with the proof of Th. 2. In addition, regime 2) is where we have a closed-form expression for both the extremizer and the optimized objective.
As motivated in §II-D, the throughput inequality constraint is natural from the operational perspective of wishing to maximize fairness subject to a minimum throughput requirement. As may be intuitive, this modification to the constraint (feasible set) has no effect on the solution, as shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: The solution in Th. 1 of the Jain throughputfairness tradeoff (20) is unaffected by changing the throughput equality constraint to an inequality constraint
The proof is found in Appendix II-B.
C. Properties of the Jain T-F Tradeoff
As can be seen from Th. 1, the extremizer (24), has the property that n * , the total number of active users (i.e., users with nonzero contention probabilities), equals t, where θ ∈ [θ t , θ t −1 ), for t ∈ {2, . . . , n}. In fact, because (24) does not depend on n, the total number of users in the system, one can easily verify that, if θ ≥ θ n−l for some integer l ∈ {1, . . . , n − 2}, then the extremizer p * is as if the total (24) in Th. 1 with t = n) (2), (7), and Def. 1) 6: end for 7: Plot F * J (θ ; m) = n m F * J (θ ; n), ∀m ∈ {n + 1, . . . , n max } 8: end for number of users in the system were n − l, except that l zeros need to be padded in order to make p * an n-dimensional vector. It follows that the maximum Jain's fairness satisfies
where our notation highlights F * J is a function of θ and is parameterized by n.
One use of the recursive relationship (25) is that it enables incremental plotting of the T-F tradeoff for a sequence of values of n ∈ {2, . . . , n max }. From Th. 1 if θ ∈ [θ n , θ n−1 ) then n * = n, meaning, at the optimum, every user in the system is active. We therefore call the interval [θ n , θ n−1 ), for each n ∈ N, the active throughput interval, meaning all n users are actively contending under the optimal control for any target throughput θ in this interval. This observation is the root idea in the Jain T-F plotting algorithm (Alg. 1), which returns a plot of the Jain T-F tradeoff over θ ∈ (0, 1) for all n ∈ {2, . . . , n max }. Naturally, the interval [θ n , θ n−1 ) must be discretized for each n. Fig. 4 (top) illustrates Alg. 1 for n max = 4 users. First, the plot of F * J (θ ; 2) over θ ∈ [θ 2 , θ 1 ) (i.e., the active interval for n = 2, thick blue) is scaled using (25) to obtain F * J (θ ; 3) and F * J (θ ; 4) over the same interval (thin blue for both). Then, the plot of F * J (θ ; 3) over θ ∈ [θ 3 , θ 2 ) (i.e., the active interval for n = 3, thick purple) is scaled to obtain F * J (θ ; 4) over the same interval (thin purple), and so on. Note first that, for each n, at θ = 1 the maximum Jain's fairness is the minimum possible, i.e., F * J = 1/n, corresponding to the fairness when only one user (say i ) contends for access (i.e., x = p = e i ), as x = e i is the unique (up to permutation) rate vector in achieving θ = 1. Second, for each n, for any θ ≤ θ n the maximum Jain's fairness is the maximum possible, i.e., F * J = 1, corresponding to all n users contending with equal probability, uniquely achievable by the rate vector x = θ u. The Jain T-F tradeoff for each n up to 4 users is shown in Fig. 4 (bottom) .
The following theorem gives some properties of the optimal controls, optimal rates, and the Jain T-F tradeoff.
Theorem 3: The Jain T-F tradeoff for n ≥ 2 users, over θ ∈ [θ n , 1), has the following properties: 1) For fixed n, the small and large contention probabilities of the optimal control, p * s (θ ), p * l (θ ), and the corresponding optimal rates, x * s (θ ), x * l (θ ), are piecewise decreasing and increasing, respectively, in θ . More precisely, fix t ∈ {2, . . . , n} and θ ∈ [θ t , θ t −1 ). Then: Fig. 4 . Top: Illustration of using Alg. 1, leveraging the Jain fairness recursion (25) , to incrementally plot the Jain T-F tradeoff for n max = 4 users. Vertical gridlines indicate the θ t 's for t ∈ {2, 3, 4}. Horizontal gridlines indicate the maximum fairness at the θ t 's for each t ∈ [n] and each n ∈ [n max ]. The T-F tradeoff for the active throughput intervals (thick curves) needs to be computed first, after which the rest parts (thin curves) can be obtained by scaling. Bottom: Th. 1 (regimes 2) and 3)): T-F tradeoff under Jain's fairness for n = 1 (blue), 2 (orange), 3 (green), and 4 (red). a) Both p * s and x * s are continuous and decreasing over each interval [θ t , θ t −1 ), but are not monotone over
l and x * l are continuous and increasing over [θ n , 1), but neither is differentiable at each θ t for t ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1}. In particular, i ) Horizontal gridlines indicate the corresponding optimal controls (top) and optimal rates (bottom) when θ = θ t . Shown also are the optimal number of active users n * for different ranges of θ .
The proof is found in Appendix II-C. Fig. 5 shows
, illustrating property 1) in Th. 3. Properties 2) through 5) in Th. 3 can be seen from Fig. 4 (bottom) . Finally, we mention that a plot of the interpolated functionT (F) (23) in Th. 1 (not shown) on the actual T-F tradeoff in Fig. 4 would show the interpolation lies above the true tradeoff, and is tight only at the critical throughputs θ.
V. α-FAIR NETWORK UTILITY MAXIMIZATION
In this section we investigate the throughput-fairness tradeoff within the framework of α-fair utility functions [6] , [7] . Recall the objective F α (for α ≥ 0), the α-fair utility function U α , the throughput function T , and the mapping between a control p and a rate vector x(p) are given in (8), (9), (5), and (2) respectively. The optimization under a throughput equality constraint is:
We solve this problem for α ≥ 1. In the following we give i ) preliminary results in §V-A, ii) the main results in §V-B, and iii) some additional properties of the α-fair throughputfairness tradeoff in §V-C.
A. Preliminary Results
We start with the special case n = 2.
Proposition 7:
The throughput-fairness tradeoff under α-fairness (α ≥ 1), for n = 2 users, is
Proof: The proof resembles that of Prop. 5 in §IV-A. The all-rates equal ray {x : x 1 = x 2 } can still be viewed as the maximum fairness line as the maximum α-fair objective is attained by points either on this line or closest to this line, subject to the throughput constraint x 1 + x 2 = θ . This follows from the Schur-concavity of the objective (Prop. 1 in §III-A) and (the proof of) Cor. 1 in §III-A. Therefore, when θ ≤ 1/2, the maximizer is on the ray {x :
2 ); when θ > 1/2, the maximizer is obtained by finding the points on the boundary of that satisfy the throughput constraint (as they are the closest to the all-rates equal ray, see Fig. 8 ), which gives (
. Substitution of the expressions of the maximizers into the objective yields (27) .
The basic idea in solving the throughput-fairness tradeoff under α-fairness (Th. 4) is to first apply Cor. 1 in §III-A to restrict the feasible set from p ∈ [0, 1) n to ∂S, and then apply Prop. 4 in §III-B to further restrict it to ∂S 1,2 . The optimization problem is solved with the aid of Prop. 8 shown below, which establishes a key monotonicity property of the objective in (26) under the throughput equality constraint over the restricted set p ∈ ∂S 2 . It plays a similar role to that of Prop. 6 in proving Th. 1 ( §IV-B) .
Leveraging the ( p s , k, n ) parameterization of p in Def. 1 and the definition of T ( p s , k, n ) in (15) in §III-B, we define
Proposition 8: Under the constraints p ∈ ∂S 2 (with p = p( p s , k, n )) and T ( p s , k, n ) = θ , the objective F α ( p s , k, n ) (28) for α ≥ 1 is increasing in k for k ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} when n is held fixed. Thus the maximum of
The proof is found in Appendix III-A.
B. Main Results
For general (n, θ), where n > 2 and θ ∈ (0, 1), we will again give an implicit characterization of the T-F tradeoff under α-fairness when α ≥ 1. The main theorem of this subsection is a characterization of the optimal control p * for each θ Fig. 6 . Illustration of Th. 4 and properties 2) and 3) in Th. 6: T-F tradeoff under α-fairness when n = 1 (blue), 2 (orange), 3 (green), and 4 (red) users, for α = 1 (top) and α = 2 (bottom). Vertical gridlines indicate the θ t 's and horizontal gridlines indicate the corresponding optimal α-fair objective for each n at θ = θ n i.e., F * α (θ n ; n). Shown as cyan dots are the "inflection" points (i.e.,θ α (n)) upon which the T-F curves transition from convex decreasing to concave decreasing, for n > 2. The thresholdingθ α (n) is computed using (144) in Appendix III-C.
(as the solution of a polynomial equation) from which we can compute F α (x(p * )).
Theorem 4 (Throughput-Fairness Tradeoff Under α-Fair When α ≥ 1): The throughput-fairness tradeoff for n ≥ 2 users under α-fairness when α ≥ 1, with a throughput equality constraint T (x) = θ , for θ ∈ (0, 1), includes two regimes, parameterized by θ : 1) if θ ≤ θ n , then the maximum fairness is
achieved when every user receives equal rate: (12) with k * = n − 1, n * = n, and p * s the unique real root on (0, 1/n) of the following polynomial equation
The proof is found in Appendix III-B. The T-F tradeoff plots for n = {1, . . . , 4} users are illustrated in Fig. 6 . Observe the difference between regime 1) in Th. 4 for α-fairness when α ≥ 1 and regime 1 in Th. 1 for Jain's fairness: although the maximizers are the same, the objective is increasing in θ in the former, whereas it is constant in the latter. Observe also the asymmetry between regime 2) in Th. 4 and regimes 2) and 3) in Th. 1: k * = n * − 1 and n * = n for all θ ∈ (θ n , 1) in the former, while k * = 1 and n * = t for θ ∈ [θ t , θ t −1 ) in the latter. Thus, the optimal control vector p * for α-fairness has n * − 1 users with "small" contention probability p * s and one user with "large" contention probability p * l for n * always equal to n, while the optimal control vector p * for Jain's fairness has one user with p * s and n * − 1 users with p * l , for n * determined by the active throughput interval containing θ .
Similar to §IV-B, we now address the case where the throughput constraint in (26) is an inequality T (x(p)) ≥ θ .
Theorem 5: If the throughput equality constraint is changed to an inequality constraint T (x(p)) ≥ θ then the solution in Th. 4 of the α-fair utility maximization problem (26) when α ≥ 1 is only affected in the first regime, namely when θ ≤ θ n . More precisely, if θ ≤ θ n , then the maximum fairness is independent of θ and is given by
where the maximizer in the control space is a uniform vector p * = u.
The proof is found in Appendix III-B.
C. Properties of the α-Fair T-F Tradeoff
The following theorem gives some properties of the optimal controls, optimal rates, and the α-fair T-F tradeoff.
Theorem 6: The T-F tradeoff for n ≥ 2 users under α-fairness for α ≥ 1, with target throughput θ ∈ (θ n , 1), has the following properties:
1) For fixed α and n, the smaller ( p * s ) and larger (p * l ) components of the optimal control are decreasing and increasing in θ respectively, i.e., 
3) For fixed α and θ ∈ (θ n , 1), the maximum α-fair objective is decreasing in n, i.e., F * α (θ ; n) > F * α (θ ; n + 1). The proof is found in Appendix III-C. Fig. 7 shows
, illustrating property 1) in Th. 6. Fig. 6 illustrates properties 2) and 3) for the cases of α = 1 (top) and α = 2 (bottom).
VI. CONCLUSION
We have presented six theorems that characterize the throughput-fairness tradeoff under finite-user slotted Aloha, using both Jain's fairness measure (Theorems 1-3) , and the α-fair measure (Theorems 4-6) for α ≥ 1. We discuss the similarities and differences of the results between the two fairness measures. Unless stated otherwise, we assume α ≥ 1, and let both the number of users n ≥ 2 and the target throughput θ ∈ (θ n , 1) be given and fixed.
We start by looking at the features common to both fairness measures.
1) θ n is a tradeoff boundary: the actual tradeoff between throughput and fairness begins for throughputs θ > θ n . 2) The T-F tradeoff is the same under a throughput equality constraint T (x) = θ and a throughput inequality constraint T (x) ≥ θ , for θ > θ n .
3) The number of distinct nonzero values among the components of the optimal control vector p * (and the corresponding optimal rate vector x(p * )) is no larger than 2, i.e., |V(p * )| ≤ 2. This observation significantly reduces the search space for solving the optimization problems. Intuitively, at the optimum, the allocation of contention probabilities (rates) among active users is expected to near the quasi-uniform distribution. 4) Under the p( p s , k, n ) parameterization (Def. 1), the small ( p * s , x * s ) and large (p * l , x * l ) component values are (piece-wise) decreasing and increasing in θ > θ n , respectively. Intuitively, as fairness (F * J , F * α ) is exchanged for throughput (θ ), the optimal user contention probability (rate) allocation becomes less uniform. 5) The T-F tradeoff curve is continuous, differentiable (with possibly a finite number of nondifferentiable points), and monotone decreasing. 6) For a fixed target throughput θ , the maximum achievable fairness at that throughput is decreasing in the number of users n. We next highlight important differences between the Aloha throughput-fairness tradeoff under the two fairness measures.
1) Consider θ ≤ θ n . The Jain's fairness value is one in this regime, the maximum possible value. In contrast, the maximum achievable α-fairness value is increasing in θ over θ ∈ [0, θ n ]. 2) Although the "small" contention probability p * s is solved from a polynomial equation (the throughput constraint) under both fairness measures, the corresponding optimal values (k * , n * ) exhibit distinct features. Under Jain's fairness k * = 1, the minimum possible, whereas under α-fairness k * = n * − 1, the maximum possible. Under Jain's fairness n * = t (when θ ∈ [θ t , θ t −1 )) and thus is independent of n, whereas under α-fairness n * = n and thus is independent of θ .
3) Under Jain's fairness, the T-F tradeoff curve is piecewise convex decreasing for all n > 2 (convex decreasing for n = 2); under α-fairness, there exists a threshold θ α (n) upon which it changes from convex decreasing to concave decreasing, again for all n > 2 (but remains concave decreasing when n = 2 for the entire θ > θ n ). 4) The recurrence (25) , which hinges on the observation that solution of the optimal p * s does not depend on n, facilitates the incremental plotting (Alg. 1 in §IV-C) under Jain's fairness. One practical implication regarding protocol/system design is that, users joining and leaving the system could be handled with ease since the needed (re)computations are very small. An analogous property under α-fairness is not evident to us.
APPENDIX I PROOFS FROM §III
Proofs from §III-A and §III-B are given in Appendix I-A and Appendix I-B respectively.
A. Proofs From §III-A
The following lemma is used in the proof of Prop. 2, below. Lemma 2: Fix a set of m ≥ 2 points V ≡ {v 1 , . . . , v m } ⊂ R n such that no v i can be expressed as a convex combination of any other points in V, and denote by C h ≡ conv(V) the convex hull of V. Fix a strictly convex set, denoted C s , whose boundary also includes the set V, namely ∂C s ⊇ V. Then the boundary of C s intersects C h only at the m points that generate C h , namely ∂C s ∩ C h = V.
Proof: Note V ⊆ ∂C s ∩C h by assumption. We need to show the intersection ∂C s ∩ C h can never include any other point. Recall a set A is strictly convex if for any x, y ∈ A, every point on the line segment connecting x and y other than the end points is in the interior of A. First we observe C s ⊇ C h , by virtue of the fact that the convex hull is the smallest convex set that contains V. Second, we prove by contradiction that the intersection ∂C s ∩ C h can only consist of points on the boundary of C h (denoted ∂C h ). Assume there exists a point v int ∈ ∂C s ∩C h that is an interior point of C h . This means there exists a neighborhood of v int that resides in C h . However, as v int is also on the boundary of C s , every neighborhood of v int must contain points that belong to neither C s nor C h (as C s ⊇ C h ). This contradiction shows ∂C s ∩ C h ⊆ ∂C h . Observe that, since C h is a polytope, it has the property that any point on its boundary aside from the vertices, i.e., v ∈ ∂C h \ V, may be expressed as a strict convex combination of two other points on the boundary, say v , v ∈ ∂C h . Third, the previous sentence applies to any point v ∈ (∂C s ∩ C h ) \ V, since such points are in ∂C h \ V. But the implied ability to represent v as a strict convex combination of v , v ∈ C s violates the assumed strict convexity of C s , since it implies a boundary point of 
Let x ∈ int
θ ; it suffices to establish x ∈ ∂ θ with x ≺ x. The geometric argument below is illustrated in Fig. 8 by replacing x * in the figure with x . Define c ≡ θ u. First: it follows from Lem. 1 that c ∈ (since θ > θ n ), but that c ∈ conv( (x)) (using the convex combination of (x) with all weights equal to 1/n!). Second: it follows from the convexity 7 of c that there exists a unique point x ∈ ∂ on the line segment connecting x with c. Third: it follows from the convexity of H θ that x ∈ H θ (which contains both x, c), and therefore, x ∈ ∂ θ (as it lies in both ∂ and H θ ). Fourth: this point x ∈ conv( (x)) by the convexity of conv( (x)) (which contains both x, c). Fifth: by Rado's result, x ≺ x, which concludes the proof of item 1).
For item 2), we again apply Rado's result and prove by contradiction. Assume there exist distinct (up to permutation) x, x both in ∂ θ satisfying x ≺ x, equivalently, x ∈ conv( (x)) ≡ C h . The contradiction will establish ∂ θ ∩ C h = (x), meaning the only feasible points (i.e., in ∂ θ ) that are majorized by x (i.e., in C h ) are permutations of the original point x. This provides the desired contradiction since permutations of a point do not majorize each other. Our approach to establishing ∂ θ ∩ C h = (x) is to apply Lem. 2, with V = (x) and C s = c θ = c ∩ H θ . To apply Lem. 2 we must show i ) C s is strictly convex, and ii) ∂C s ⊇ V, i.e., ∂ θ ⊇ (x) (since ∂ c = ∂ ). The lemma establishes the desired result, ∂C s ∩ C h = (x). It remains to show i ) and ii). i ) Subramanian and Leith [30, Lemma 1, Remark 1, Sec. II-A] have shown that c is strictly convex 8 in R n + . As strict 7 The complement of , i.e., c ≡ R n + \ is shown to be convex by Post in [27] . 8 Post [27] establishes the tangent hyperplane equation of every point on ∂ . convexity is preserved under intersection with affine spaces (with the ambient space also intersected with these affine spaces), it follows that C s is strictly convex. ii) By assumption x ∈ ∂ θ , which ensures (x) ⊂ ∂ θ since and H θ are permutation invariant. This establishes item 2).
Proof of Cor. 1 for the Case of Jain's Fairness (7) (Formulated as (20)):
Given that x * satisfies the throughput constraint x * ∈ H θ , we need to show x * ∈ ∂ , i.e., the optimal rate vector x * is Pareto efficient. Refer to Fig. 8 2 is minimized (over x ∈ H θ ∩ ). Observe the assumption θ ≥ θ n ensures c ∈ ∂ for θ > θ n , and c = m ∈ ∂ for θ = θ n (in which case the unique global minimizer is x * = m). Fix a candidate feasible point x ∈ H θ ∩ and consider the line segment connecting x with c: it must intersect ∂ , and this point is denoted x * (x). It is clear that any feasible x on the line segment (x, c) not equal to x * (x) is suboptimal to (x), c) . This shows the desired minimizer x * ∈ ∂ . Equivalently ( [27] , recall (3)) this means the corresponding optimal control p * (in the sense of (2); defined in §IV-B) is in ∂S.
B. Proofs From §III-B Proof of Prop. 3:
We prove the three statements in the order they are given. 2 and T (x(p) ), we may write T ( p s , k, n ) = kx s + (n − k)x l . Substituting the expressions for x s , x l in (13) in Def. 1 yields:
Proof of 1): Observe by definition of p ∈ ∂S
The partial derivative w.r.t. p s is 
Proof of 2):
Since n is fixed, we write
As θ n is constant in k, while θ n −k is increasing in k, it follows that the intervals forming each R(k, n ) are nested and increasing in k.
Proof of 3):
, and iii) by assumption, the target θ lies in [θ t , θ t −1 ), for some t ∈ {2, . . . , n}. First, observe n ≥ t needs to hold, since for n ≤ t − 1 we have
Second, refer to Fig. 1 (bottom) . As evident from the figure, θ ∈ R(k, n ) if and only if k ∈ {n − t + 1, . . . , n − 1}.
Proof of Prop. 4:
We prove the two statements in the order they are given.
Proof of i ):
The main idea of the proof is to establish the impossibility of any p ∈ [0, 1) n simultaneously being an extremizer and having |V(p)| > 2. Observe we may partition the feasible set [0, 1) n into {p ∈ [0, 1) n : |V(p)| ≤ 2} and {p ∈ [0, 1) n : |V(p)| > 2}. We now show any p with |V(p)| > 2 cannot satisfy the KKT conditions, given below, necessary for p to be an extremizer.
We first consider the case of a throughput inequality con-
The first-order Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) necessary conditions 9 for a local maximizer are, for each i ∈ [n]:
The KKT conditions for a minimizer are the same, with the signs of each Lagrange multiplier associated with each inequality constraint reversed. As is evident from the proof below, the sign of the multipliers is inessential to establishing the result, and therefore the result holds for both minimization and maximization. The first step of the proof is to derive the condition g k = 0 in (41) below from the KKT stationarity condition
Towards that goal, we make the following definitions, where the dependence of these quantities upon p is omitted for brevity: (2) may be written in terms of π as
π. Differentiation of (35) yields:
The following partial derivatives may be established after some algebra:
Substitution of the above into (38) yields
where g = (g i , i ∈ [n]) has components
The quantity g i has the following important property: if k ∈ [n] is such that 0 < p k < 1 then stationarity and complementary slackness require
, which in turn requires g k = 0. Next fix two distinct indices, i 1 and i 2 , 9 It can be verified that one of the (strongest) constraint qualifications (regularity conditions that guarantee KKT conditions do not fail), the LICQ (linear independence constraint qualification) is satisfied unless possibly at a "quasi-uniform" vector p i.e., one with |V(p)| = 1 meaning all the nonzero component(s) of this p take(s) a common value; yet such a candidate p is included in the statement of the proposition (item i)). such that 0 < p i 1 , p i 2 < 1, which by the above argument, requires g i 1 = g i 2 = 0. Substituting (41) into this equation, substituting the earlier expressions for π i and x i , and solving for μ θ yields:
where
Here μ θ (i 1 , i 2 ) denotes the unique value of the Lagrange multiplier μ θ enforced by the KKT conditions for indices i 1 , i 2 .
As, by assumption, |V(p)| > 2, there exist at least three distinct indices { j, k, l} with 0 < p j < p k < p l < 1. As there can only be one value for μ θ , it follows that
and simplifying gives
The assumed ordering of p j , p k , p l ensures that p k may be written as a convex combination of
By the assumptions on p j , p k , and p l , both t and 1 − t are in (0, 1). Subtitution of the above into (44) yields:
To summarize thus far, the KKT conditions applied to these three distinct nonzero values require each of the three pairs of indices to agree on the value of the Lagrange multiplier μ θ (42), and this is equivalent to the condition that (46) holds for t in (45). The natural interpretation of (46) is that the function f 1 (y; α) has the property that the convex combination, with parameter t, of the values f 1 ( p l ) and f 1 ( p j ) equals the value of f 1 at the convex combination of the arguments p j and p l with the same parameter t. Geometrically, this requires the Fig. 9 (top) . Recall a univariate function f is strictly convex if its domain dom f is convex and for all distinct y 1 , y 2 ∈ dom f f (sy 1 +s y 2 ) < s f (y 1 ) +s f (y 2 ), ∀s ∈ (0, 1), (47) and is strictly concave if the inequality is reversed. In particular, the above strict inequality, for both strictly convex and strictly concave functions, ensures (46) cannot hold for any t, and thus a contradiction is reached in the assumed optimality of the p with three or more distinct values, for any α for which f 1 (y; α) is strictly convex or strictly concave. Our analysis is inconclusive in the regime where f 1 (y; α) is neither strictly convex nor strictly concave: it may or may not be possible to satisfy (46). This motivates us to investigate the convexity/concavity of the function f 1 (y; α) in y. The second derivative (w.r.t. y) is
for
Since the domain of y is (0, 1), the sign of f
1 (y; α) is determined by f 2 (α; y), which we view as a quadratic in α with parameter y. Recall f (2) 1 (y; α) ≷ 0 is a sufficient condition for f 1 (y; α) to be strictly convex (concave) in y.
Define the sets
and note f 1 (y; α) is strictly convex in y for α ∈ A f 2 . Next,
Similarly it can be verified there is no value of α ∈ R for which f 2 (α; y) < 0 for all y ∈ (0, 1), meaning f 1 (y; α) is not strictly concave on (0, 1) for any α. In summary, we've established the impossibility of an optimal p having Fig. 9 (middle).
We next consider the case of a throughput equality constraint, T (x(p)) = θ . The only change in the KKT conditions from the inequality constraint case is that now the sign of the Lagrange multiplier μ θ is unrestricted. However, observe that the above proof for the inequality constraint case does not rely upon the dual feasibility condition of μ θ . As such, the above proof holds in this case as well.
Proof of ii ): By assumption that the optimizer p * has |V(p * )| = 2, we denote the two nonzero component values by 0 < p k < p l < 1. We prove by contradiction. Assuming the throughput constraint does not hold with equality namely T (x(p * )) > θ , it follows that the corresponding Lagrange multiplier μ θ is zero, and in particular we must have μ θ (k, l) = 0 in (42). This expression may be rearranged as f 3 
We next establish that f 3 (y; α) is strictly monotone in y ∈ (0, 1) for all α ∈ (−∞, −1] ∪ [1, ∞), as illustrated in Fig. 9 (bottom) . This strict monotonicity means it is impossible to have 0 < p k < p l < 1 and
And thus f 3 is either always strictly monotone increasing (when α ∈ (−∞, −1]) or always strictly monotone decreasing in y (when α ∈ [1, ∞)), for all y ∈ (0, 1). This implies μ θ (k, l) = 0 cannot hold, which in turn implies, as a consequence of complementary slackness, at an optimizer p * that has the property that |V(p * )| = 2, the throughput inequality constraint must be tight i.e., T (x(p * )) = θ . Note that in all the above analysis, the expression for the α = 1 case of F α , defined in (8), is used. As the claimed regime of α (i.e., (−∞, −1] ∪ [1, ∞)) to which the assertion of this proposition applies includes α = 1, it is necessary to verify it also holds for this case. This is done separately below.
Proof of Prop. 4 for the α = 1 Case: We prove the two parts in the order they are given.
Proof of i ):
The domain p ∈ [0, 1) n allows us to rule out the possibility of any component p i = 1. We will further dismiss the case when there exists some component p i = 0, because if any such zero component exists in p, then the corresponding rate x i = 0, which gives the objective F 1 (x(p)) = −∞ meaning it is uninteresting/infeasible if we were to minimize/maximize F 1 (x). Let p obey |V(p)| > 2; we will show any such point cannot satisfy the KKT conditions.
We first consider the case of a throughput inequality con- maximized (for x > 0) , we work withF 1 . Introduce Lagrange multipliers μ θ , λ, and ν, and form exactly the same Lagrangian (35), with the objective replaced byF 1 .
As 0 < p i < 1 it follows that λ i = ν i = 0. As 0 < p i < 1 holds for all i ∈ [n], it follows that π(p) = 0, and as such the stationarity equation
= 0 of (35) may be solved for μ θ :
where 
Here A(i 1 , i 2 ) denotes the value of A(p) obtained from the KKT stationarity condition for indices i 1 , i 2 . Now consider three distinct indices { j, k, l} with 0 < p j < p k < p l < 1. As there can only be one value for A, it follows that A( j, k) = A( j, l) = A(k, l). Equating any pair out of these three and simplifying yields p s = 1/n where s is the common index in the two pairs of indices. Collectively this implies p j = p k = p l = 1/n, which is a contradiction. This shows |V(p)| ≤ 2.
We now consider the case of a throughput equality constraint, T (x(p)) = θ . In this case there is no restriction on the sign of the corresponding Lagrange multiplier μ θ . Regardless, the above proof holds as well.
Proof of ii ): For the second part of the proposition, we prove by contradiction. Given |V(p * )| = 2, meaning p * has components p k , p l satisfying 0 < p k < p l < 1, if the throughput inequality constraint is not tight at p * , then due to complementary slackness it follows μ θ = 0, which would imply p k = p l = 1/n, a contradiction.
APPENDIX II PROOFS FROM §IV
Proofs from §IV-A, §IV-B, and §IV-C are given in Appendix II-A, Appendix II-B, and Appendix II-C, respectively.
A. Proofs From §IV-A
Proof of Prop. 6: We establish the two statements in the order they are given.
Proof of 1): Recall the implicit definition of p s (k, n , θ) in (17) in Prop. 3 enables us to write T ( p s (k, n , θ) , k, n ) = θ .
Note first that θ is held constant in Prop. 6. Moreover, in the proof of 1) we furthermore hold n constant, while in the proof of 2) we instead hold n l = n − k constant. Because of this, we suppress in the proof of 1) the dependence on both θ and n , and in particular, p s (k) is defined as the unique solution, when it exists, to the equation (22) , k) , and as such we can apply the implicit function theorem:
The total derivative 10 of
Computing and substituting the three derviatives in the above expression yields:
It is evident from (57) that showing
and
In F −1 , f 1 , f 2 , f 3 above the variable p s is not in fact free, but instead is determined by T ( p s (k), k) = θ . Below, we show a stronger result that in fact (59) holds for all k ≥ 0 and 10 In this case, some authors such as Chiang and Wainwright [31] may call this partial total derivative and use a different notation (see discussion toward the end of Section 8.4). It is "partial" because the function (F −1 ) by definition still depends on another exogenous variable (n ); it is "total" in that it fully captures both the direct and indirect influence of k.
for all p s ∈ (0, 1/n ). Our approach to showing (59) is as follows: to show two univariate functions g 1 (x), g 2 (x) with domain R + are ordered as g 1 (x) < g 2 (x) for all x, it suffices to show i ) g 1 (x) ≤ g 2 (x) and ii) g 1 (0) < g 2 (0) (which can be easily verified by working with a new function g 2 (x)− g 1 (x)). The first step towards (59) is to establish the ordering of the derivatives.
substitute z into (60), and observe:
The first inequality in (64) follows from the series expansion of log(1 + z) and valid for all z > 0. The second inequality in (64) is established by computing
which is positive for all n ≥ 3. Note n ≥ 2 since p ∈ ∂S 2 , and the n = 2 case can be skipped as k = 1 always holds. This concludes the proof of the first part of the proposition. Proof of 2): In the second statement of Prop. 6 we again hold θ constant, but instead of also holding n constant (as in the first statement), we now hold n l constant, where n l is the number of components in p ∈ ∂S 2 taking (the larger) value p l . It is clear that we can just as easily parameterize p ∈ ∂S 2 using the three free parameters [ p s , k, n l ] as with ( p s , k, n ) (the change in parameterization emphasized by the change from parentheses to square braces) using the mapping k + n l = n (with p s and k still defined as before). The new parameters must take values such that p s ∈ (0, 1/(k + n l )), and (k, n l ) ∈ D n , where
We now define the functions
Analogous to part 1) of the proof, we suppress the dependence upon n l and θ , and again because the throughput equality constraint determines p s as a function of k, we write p s [k, n l , θ] as p s [k] , the throughput constraint function as T [ p s [k] , k] = θ , and the objective
It is straightforward to establish of ( p s , k) , and as such we can apply the implicit function theorem (which again treats k as a continuous variable):
The total derivative of F −1 w.r.t. k is
Computing and substituting the above derivatives yields
and the sign of the derivative is easily seen to equal the sign of the above function. Thus part 2) of the proposition is established by showing
This concludes the proof of the second part of the proposition.
B. Proofs From §IV-B
Proof of Th. 1: There are three regimes for θ given in Th. 1. The proof consists of two parts: part i ) addresses regime 1, while part ii) addresses regimes 2) and 3).
Part i ) (Regime 1)): The claim here is that the maximum fairness of 1 is achievable, attained when all the x i 's are equal to θ/n. It is not hard to see all the x i 's are equal iff all the associated controls p i 's (i.e., satisfying (2)) are equal, in which case θ/n = x i = p(1 − p) n−1 for each i ∈ [n], for some p ∈ [0, 1] to be determined. The existence of such a p follows from Lem. 1 and thus the claim is proved.
Part i i ) (Regimes 2) and 3)): This part of the proof is divided into three steps. Recall p * denotes the optimal control.
Step 1: p * ∈ ∂S. That p * must be a probability vector follows from Cor. 1 in §III-A.
Step 2: p * ∈ ∂S 1,2 . By Prop. 4 in §III-B, |V(p * )| ≤ 2, as the minimization problem (20) is a special case of the extremization problem (19) in Prop. 4 with α = −1. Then together with p * ∈ ∂S, it gives p * ∈ ∂S 1,2 .
Step 3: Following Remark 3, regimes 2) and 3) are grouped together meaning the target throughput θ ∈ [θ t , θ t −1 ). By item 3) in Prop. 3, the set of feasible (k, n ) pairs for which there exists a p ∈ ∂S 1,2 satisfying T (x(p)) = θ is the set D t,n in (18) , illustrated in Fig. 1 .
Case 1: Assuming p * ∈ ∂S 2 , we can then apply the two monotonicity properties stated in Prop. 6 to the set D t,n , which shows the optimal (k * , n * ) = (1, t) . Applying (k , n ) = (1, t) to the throughput constraint equation (17) Case 2: Assuming p * ∈ ∂S 1 , we let such a p * be parameterized by n (Def. 1). The corresponding extremizer in the rate space is x * = x * (n ) ≡ θ n n n i=1 e i . Satisfying the feasibility constraint T (x * ) = θ for θ ∈ [θ t , θ t −1 ) requires n ≤ t, and in fact n can only equal t due to its integer support. This shows the optimal n * = t (thus p * = (1/t) t i=1 e i and F * J = t/n). Furthermore, this in turn shows if θ = θ t then the corresponding p * ∈ ∂S 1 .
Clearly the target throughput range [θ t , θ t −1 ) is partitioned as (θ t , θ t −1 ) ∪ {θ t } where the extremizers for the former (regime 3)) and latter (regime 2)) are found in cases 1 and 2 respectively.
Finally,T (F) in (23) is obtained by observing the above results for regime 2 as n points {(T t , F t )} t ∈[n] on the throughput-fairness tradeoff plot, with T t = θ t and F t = t/n. Thus, to interpolate the n points via a functionT (F) it suffices to useT (F) = T nF and treat F as a continuous variable.
Proof of Th. 2: Part i ) (Regime 1)): In the proof of Thm. 1 it is shown that in this regime, the maximum fairness 1 can be attained with the throughput constraint satisfied with equality. This continues to hold here.
Part i i ) (Regimes 2) and 3)): The second and third regimes namely the case when θ ≥ θ n .
Step 1: p * ∈ ∂S. This is because the global minimizer must lie on a hyperplane H θ * = {x : i x i = θ * } for some θ * ≥ θ . Then the same step in the proof of Th. 1 applies.
Step 2: p * ∈ ∂S 1,2 . The same step in the proof of Th. 1 applies, as the extremization problem (19) in Prop. 4 includes the case of throughput inequality constraint.
Step 3 is divided into two sub-steps, one for each regime. Recall ∂S 1,2 is the disjoint union of ∂S 1 and ∂S 2 , and n denotes the number of nonzero component(s) of p * .
Regime 2): when θ = θ t for some t ∈ [n]. Case 1: Assuming p * ∈ ∂S 2 , since item ii) of Prop. 4 says under the assumption |V(p * )| = 2, an extremizer has to satisfy the throughput constraint with equality, this justifies we can apply Th. 1 (regime 2)). Doing so gives the extremizer as p * = (1/t) t i=1 e i . But this contradicts our assumption that p * ∈ ∂S 2 .
Case 2: Assuming p * ∈ ∂S 1 , it follows that x(p * ) = θ n n n i=1 e i . On one hand, T (x(p * )) ≥ θ for such an x requires n ≤ t; on the other hand, the objective F −1 (x(p * )), to be minimized, is decreasing in n . Together they imply the optimal n * = t, with the corresponding fairness F * J = t/n. Therefore, the extremizer for θ = θ t actually comes from ∂S 1 and is given by p * = (1/t) t i=1 e i with F * J = t/n. Regime 3): when θ ∈ (θ t , θ t −1 ) for some t ∈ {2, . . . , n}. Case 1: Assuming p * ∈ ∂S 1 : similar to what we have done above, satisfying the feasibility constraint T (x) ≥ θ requires n ≤ t − 1, while the objective function F −1 (x) is decreasing in n which means n is desired to be as large as possible. Together they imply the optimal n * = t − 1, with the corresponding fairness F * J = (t − 1)/n. Case 2: Assuming p * ∈ ∂S 2 : again item ii) of Prop. 4 justifies Th. 1 (regime 3)) is applicable. Furthermore, in this case, the optimal solution p * from ∂S 2 is such that F * J ∈ ((t − 1)/n, t/n) due to the monotonicity and continuity of the T-F tradeoff curve (Th. 3, items 2, 4) and the just proved result for regime 2). As the optimal solution from ∂S 2 outperforms that from ∂S 1 , this shows the desired extremizer is indeed from ∂S 2 and is as stated for regime 3) in Th. 1.
In summary, the solution to the Jain throughput-fairness tradeoff (20) remains unchanged.
C. Proofs From §IV-C
The following lemma is essential to the proof of item 5) of Th. 3.
Lemma 3: Given an integer n ≥ 3, the following two polynomials in n are both positive for p s ∈ (0, 1/n). Part i i ) ( f nu (n; p s ) > 0): The condition p s ∈ (0, 1/n) for n ≥ 3 translates to n ∈ [3, 1/ p s ). We will focus on showing f nu (n; p s ) as a polynomial in n does not have any real root on n ∈ [3, 1/ p s ), which suggests f nu (n; p s ) is either always positive or always negative in this interval and we then only need to test this out using any specific point in the interval. A plot of f nu (n; p s ) versus n for fixed p s is shown in Fig. 10 . In the following we will show a slightly stronger result, namely to extend the domain of interest to (2, 1/ p s ). For notational simplicity we let p s = 1/m for m > n and express the coefficients of the polynomial f nu (n; p s ) using m, and we will also use the shorter notation f nu (n). The j th derivative (w.r.t.
We use the Budan-Fourier theorem, which (partially) characterizes the number of real roots of a polynomial in any given Fig. 10 . f nu (n; p s ) when p s = 1/9; the top part (which does not intersect the n-axis) is not shown, in order to better view all the roots. Three of them are between 1 and 2 and the remaining one is in (1/ p s , ∞) . As f nu (n; p s ) is a 4 th order polynomial in n, it has a total of four roots and hence no root exists in the interval (2, 1/ p s ) .
interval. Specifically, let v(a) and v(b) denote the number of sign changes (i.e., sign variation) of the Fourier sequence The Fourier sequence at a = 2 and b = m are given below in a form that facilitates checking their sign. Namely: onto the second interval (for which n * = t − 1), similarly,with l = 1 and taking the derivative w.r.t. θ gives 11 
The inequality comes from a series expansion of the natural logarithm based on the inverse hyperbolic tangent function log y = 2 tanh
yields (where tanh −1 is the inverse hyperbolic tangent function) the total derivative
We further compute the partial derivative of h 1 ( p s , k) w.r.t. k and get
Applying inequality (10), h 2 ( p s , k) may be bounded as
which shows , k) , namely the total derivative (111), is positive, implying the optimality of k * = n − 1.
B. Proofs From §V-B
Proof of Th. 4: Regime 1): θ ≤ θ n . That the maximizer is a uniform vector follows from the Schur-concavity of F α w.r.t. x (Prop. 1, or [29, Ch. 3, Th. A. 4] ) , and the fact that when θ ≤ θ n the "all-rates-equal" vector is always feasible, as the uniform vector is majorized by all the other vectors that have the same component sums. To establish this feasibility, we assume the optimal rate vector x * is such that x * i = p * (1 − p * ) n−1 = θ/n, i ∈ [n], and attempt to solve for p * ∈ [0, 1]. The existence of such a p * follows from Lem. 1 and hence the feasibility is proved. When α = 1, an alternative way to show the "all-rates equal" vector is optimal is by using the AM-GM inequalitỹ F 1 (x) = i x i ≤ i x i /n n = (θ/n) n , whereF 1 ≡ e F 1 (x) .
As this inequality is tight when all the x i 's ( p i 's) are equal, the maximumF * 1 = (θ/n) n will be attained if there exists a vector p * = p * 1 that satisfies the throughput constraint namely
Regime 2): θ ∈ (θ n , 1). First, p * ∈ ∂S follows from Cor. 1 in §III-A. Second, observe n * = n as otherwise any inactive user (i.e., one with zero contention probability) will make the objective F α go to −∞. Third, we claim p * ∈ ∂S 2 . To see this, we apply Prop. 4 (item i )), which, together with the fact p * ∈ ∂S and n * = n, implies that there is no feasible point if |V(p * )| = 1, and hence |V(p * )| = 2, meaning p * ∈ ∂S 2 . Fourth, when n * = n and θ are fixed, the throughput constraint (17) implicitly defines p s as a function of k and thus we write F α ( p s (k), k) (with n * suppressed). It then follows from the analysis based on the total derivative, shown in Prop. 8, that the optimal k * = n − 1. Finally, the existence and uniqueness of p * s follows from Prop. 3 and recognizing that (30) is (17) specialized with k = n − 1 and n = n.
Proof of Th. 5: Regime 1): θ ≤ θ n . Denote the original optimization problem (26) with a throughput equality constraint T (x) =θ by P = (θ), and denote the current optimization problem with a throughput inequality constraint T (x) ≥ θ by P ≥ (θ ). The current problem, P ≥ (θ ), may be viewed as a twolayer optimization problem where the inner layer is P = (θ), i.e., P ≥ (θ ) = maxθ ∈[θ,1] P = (θ). This can be further decomposed as the following 
(118)
For the first term in (118), since we can verify that F * α (θ ) in (29) of Th. 4 is increasing in θ , for regime 1), this shows maxθ ∈[θ,θ n ] P = (θ) = P = (θ n ) with the maximizer p = (1/n)1. For the second term, based on the fact that there exists a tradeoff between target throughput and the α-fair objective for regime 2) (Th. 6, item 2)), it follows that maxθ ∈(θ n ,1) P = (θ) ≤ P = (θ n ). For the third term, it can be seen that P = (1) = −∞ because the only feasible point achieving a target throughput of 1 is e i . Therefore, the solution of (118) when θ ≤ θ n is given in (31) , attained when p * = (1/n)1 = u.
Regime 2): θ ∈ (θ n , 1). Observe the maximum of the objective will be attained when there exists some θ * ∈ [θ, 1) for which the throughput constraint holds with equality namely T (x(p * )) = θ * , then similar to what was shown in the proof of Th. 4 (regime 2), we can show p * ∈ ∂S 2 . Consequently, Prop. 4 (item ii)) says the throughput inequality constraint is tight, namely θ * = θ , and thus the rest part in the proof of Th. 4 (regime 2) applies here. Therefore the assertion in regime 2 of Th. 4 continues to hold. 
Observe the following equivalence of events
By substituting the definition of Z given in (134), the expression −Z + (1 − p * s ) can be expressed as a quadratic in p * s (with a negative coefficient of the term p * 2 s ) whose smaller ( p * s− ) and larger (p * s+ ) roots are
Therefore (138) is equivalent to The symmetry axis of f quad ( p * s , n) is given by 3 2n > 1 n and f quad is decreasing on p * s ∈ (0, 1/n) from 1 to 2/n − 1. Therefore, when n = 2, f quad ( p * s , n) remains positive for all p * s ∈ (0, 1/n) meaning the T-F curve is always concave. When n > 2, the thresholdingp * s is the smaller root of this quadratic namelyp * s (1, n > 2) =
which can be verified to be the same as the one obtained by solving (143) with α = 1.
Item 3):
We now investigate the dependence on n while holding α ≥ 1 and target throughput θ ∈ (θ n , 1) both fixed. In this case it is clear from Th. 4 that F * α in (121) should be understood as
In the following we compute the total derivative of F α ( p * s (n), n) w.r.t. n and show it is negative. d dn
where (a) is by using the implicit function theorem, analogous to (55). We now address the cases α = 1 and α > 1 respectively. When α = 1 (148) simplifies to
where the first bounding is by applying (10) to log(1 − p * s ). When α > 1 (148) can be shown to be
As p * s ∈ (0, 1/n), it follows that
As x * α s < x * α l , it follows that f 1 ( p * s , n) is the summation of two positive numbers and hence dF α>1 dn < 0.
